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Abstract
We investigate possible eﬀects of network neutrality regulation on the distribution of
content in the Internet. We model a two-sided market, where consumers and advertisers
interact through Content Providers (CPs), and CPs and consumers through Internet
Service Providers (ISPs). Multiple impressions of an ad on a consumer are partially
wasteful. Thus, equilibrium ad rates decrease with the number of CPs consumers can
browse. Under network neutrality, CPs can connect to any ISP for free, while in the
unregulated regime they have to pay a (non-discriminatory) access fee set by the ISP. We
show that universal distribution of content is always an equilibrium with net neutrality
regulation. Instead, in the unregulated regime, ISPs can use access fees to rule out
universal distribution when it is not proﬁtable, i.e. when repeated impressions of an ad
rapidly lose value and consumers care for content availability to a small extent. We also
ﬁnd that the unregulated regime is never superior to net neutrality from a welfare point
of view. Consumer and advertiser surplus are weakly higher under net neutrality. ISPs
are unambiguously better oﬀ in the unregulated regime, while CPs are unambiguously
worse oﬀ.
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1 Introduction
Traditionally, the Internet has been characterized by the net neutrality principle. This prin-
ciple refers, in a nutshell, to the fact that all Internet traﬃc should be treated equally and has
various practical implications. In particular, it implies a zero-price and a non-discrimination
rule (Schuett, 2010). The former refers to the fact that Internet Service Providers (hereafter,
ISPs) should not collect fees from Content Providers (hereafter, CPs) to deliver (or "termi-
nate") contents to ﬁnal users, while the latter refers to the fact that ISPs should not provide
diﬀerent quality of service to diﬀerent CPs. Presently, the extent to which net neutrality
should be codiﬁed in formal regulation is the subject of a very important policy debate.
Opponents assert that termination fees and traﬃc discrimination are vital to ensure a more
eﬃcient use of bandwidth and strengthen incentives for investment in network infrastructure.
Proponents argue instead that net neutrality regulation is necessary to preserve plurality on
the Internet, alongside incentives for innovation and creation of content (Kramer et al., 2012).
The above issues have received considerable attention in previous economic literature
(which we review in Section 2 below). There is however another aspect of net neutrality that
has been much less scrutinized thus far. Namely, the implications of (relaxing) a zero price
rule for Internet fragmentation and for competition on the online advertising market. While
pricing and traﬃc management can, in principle, improve eﬃciency, there are concerns that
they could also lead to a fragmented Internet, with portions of consumers not being able to
access content available to others (Lee and Wu, 2009, Werbach, 2009).
Policymakers are clearly sensitive to the issue. In the US, the FCC adopted a policy
statement adhering to the principle that "consumers are entitled to access the lawful In-
ternet content of their choice" (FCC, 2005). European Commission Vice-President Neelie
Kroes stated that “any content or application that is legal and which does not cause undue
congestion or otherwise harm other users or network integrity should be fully accessible” (see
http://edri.org/node/3281). Furthermore, Dutch MEP Marietje Schaake recently expressed
concerns that "In the absence of regulation, internet providers could block access to certain
news or entertainment sites because of their ﬁnancial interests".1 As a matter of fact, the
Netherlands are among the countries that formally adopted legislation forbidding ISPs from
charging termination fees to content providers. Several other governments are considering
doing the same.
Our objective in this paper is to shed some light on these issues. To keep the analysis
as simple and transparent as possible, we consider a model with two CPs and analyze both
the case of a monopolist ISP and of two competing ISPs. An ISP is a platform connecting
1See EUObserver. com, "Brussels to table net neutrality rules". Retrieved June 2013.
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consumers to CPs and a CP is a platform selling consumers’ attention to advertisers. Con-
sumers pay the ISP for connection to the Internet and browse content free of charge. We
study two diﬀerent regulatory regimes: under net neutrality, a zero-price rule is enforced and
CPs can connect to ISPs for free. In the unregulated regime, instead, ISPs make access to
their users conditional on the payment of an access fee.2
It is well recognized that the Internet is a two-sided market bringing together consumers
and advertisers. Yet, to the best of our knowledge, previous literature on net neutrality
has never explicitly modeled the advertising side. In contrast, we model revenue collected
by CPs as arising from equilibrium outcomes in that market. Our model accounts for the
stylized fact that the marginal value of impressing a consumer with an ad decreases with the
number of times she is exposed to it. For instance, an ad that reaches a consumer that is
already informed about a product could be (at least partially) wasted, since she could elicit
no more information from it.3 As suggested by Athey et al. (2012), the fact that consumers
consult several contents in a short time frame (which is common on the Internet) means that
advertisers placing ads on multiple CPs run the risk that their impressions are viewed by the
same consumer multiple times. Consequently, the willingness to pay for advertising slots by
multi-homing advertisers diminishes when audiences overlap.4 This implies that a CP may
prefer a small audience, that can browse few other contents, to a large one that browses a wide
set of contents. Indeed, in our model, when impressing an ad on a consumer after the ﬁrst
time is much less valuable than doing it for the ﬁrst time, competition among CPs strongly
reduces the proﬁtability of ad spaces. On the contrary, when repeated ad impressions lose
little value, the impact of competition on advertising proﬁts is limited.
There is evidence that, while advertisers place increasingly large quantities of ads on-
line, competition keeps advertising rates low.5 As long as competition to attract advertisers
reduces proﬁts, one would expect CPs to try to soften it by targeting diﬀerent consumers.
However, when connection to ISPs is free for CPs this may prove diﬃcult to sustain.6 This
2We disregard service tiering and quality discrimination for simplicity. One could however see exclusion
from an ISP’s network in our model as resulting from strong degradation of service for CPs that do not
acquire access to the high quality tier.
3See, for example, Calvano and Jullien (2011), Anderson et al. (2011), Athey et al. (2012) and Ambrus
and Reisinger (2006).
4As a response, Internet platforms introduce tracking technologies that reduce within-outlet waste. How-
ever, if cross-outlet tracking is imperfect (or, in the extreme, absent as we assume) the problem is not solved.
5Todd Haskell, vice-president of advertising for the New York Times, stated that rates for online-video
ads have recently not been increasing though publishers have more demand than supply. He also stated that
publishers may seek diﬀerentiation from competitors as a way to “avoid the downward commoditized price
positioning” of ad slots (from "If Media’s Future Is Online, Where Are the Proﬁts?" - WSJ.com, retrieved
June 2013).
6Taylor (2012) argues that “Advertisers [...] value exclusive access to consumers’ attention” and “publishers
typically have no direct inﬂuence over their rivals’ advertising business.”
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suggests that there may be an important link between network neutrality, Internet fragmen-
tation and competition on the advertising market. Indeed, we show that, by strategically
setting non-discriminatory access fees, ISPs may fragment the Internet. The rationale for
doing so, we argue, is to increase the power of the distributed CPs on the advertising market.
This, in turn, increases the proﬁts that ISPs can extract from them.
The results we obtain run as follows. In the net neutrality regime, ISPs have a very
passive role. If a single ISP is active on the market, all CPs connect to it in equilibrium. If
two ISPs operate in the market, there is always an equilibrium where all CPs access both ISPs
(to which we refer as “universal connection”). When the proﬁtability of competitively priced
ad spaces is too low, there also exists an equilibrium in which each CP joins a diﬀerent ISP
(to which we refer as “total fragmentation”). This is, in particular, the case when repeated
impressions of an ad on the same consumers rapidly lose value. We also ﬁnd that the extent
to which consumers value contents and their complementarity play quite a counterintuitive
role in the net neutrality regime. Both reduce (all else given) the likelihood of universal
connection and increase that of total fragmentation. This crucially depends on the fact that
advertising rates decrease with overlapping viewerships.
In the unregulated regime, CPs can access an ISP’s consumers only by paying a fee. This
signiﬁcantly changes the forces shaping the network conﬁguration. Since they can recover CPs
proﬁts via the access fee, ISPs behave as editors, caring about the proﬁtability of the content
they carry. Hence, when competition strongly reduces ad rates, ISPs have an incentive to
use access fees to discard universal connection. If a single ISP is active on the market, the
equilibrium is such that both CPs access the network when competitive ad rates are high
enough, while one is excluded when they are small, hence when repeated ad impressions
have little value.7 With a duopoly of ISPs, we obtain that when the impact of competition
on advertising proﬁts is limited, the equilibrium entails universal distribution. Otherwise,
total fragmentation is the unique equilibrium. In the unregulated regime, content value
and complementarity play a more intuitive role than under net neutrality. Both reduce the
likelihood (all else given) of total fragmentation, fostering competition among ISPs to attract
content. However, complementarity does not aﬀect the likelihood of universal connection.
When comparing the two regulatory regimes, our results suggest that the absence of
net neutrality regulation makes universal distribution of contents less likely. More precisely,
conditions for universal connection to be the unique equilibrium are always weaker with net
neutrality than in its absence. Moreover, with net neutrality, universal connection is always
an equilibrium, even if each CP would make higher proﬁts with a segmented network, being
exclusively distributed by a diﬀerent ISP. In contrast, in the unregulated regime, the strategic
7With a monopolist ISP, an equilibrium always exists and is unique.
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use of access fees by ISPs can impede universal connection. Indeed, when competition among
CPs strongly impacts their proﬁtability, total fragmentation is the unique equilibrium in the
unregulated regime and universal connection is unattainable. However, a change in the
regulatory regime does not necessarily imply a change in the network conﬁguration. First,
when the impact of competition on advertising proﬁts is small, universal distribution is the
only equilibrium, even without net neutrality regulation. Second, total fragmentation can
take place even if net neutrality is maintained. This is the case when competition among
CPs strongly reduces their proﬁtability as advertising outlets. It follows that, although
net neutrality certainly helps preserving universal access to online content, the extent to
which repeated ad impressions lose value plays an important role in shaping the network
conﬁguration, regardless of the regulatory regime.
By inﬂuencing the market conﬁguration that emerges in equilibrium, the regulatory
regime may strongly aﬀect social welfare. Since it maximizes gross surplus at both ends
of the market (i.e. for consumers and advertisers), universal distribution is the most desir-
able conﬁguration for society as a whole. Also consumer surplus is maximized under universal
distribution, since consumers enjoy more contents and transportation costs are minimized.
Hence, net neutrality (weakly) maximizes, consumers and social welfare. Finally, without
net neutrality, ISPs are unambiguously better oﬀ, while CPs are unambiguously worse oﬀ.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant lit-
erature. Section 3 presents the model, which is solved in Section 4 for the monopoly ISPs
and Section 5 for duopoly ISPs. Section 6 concludes. Part of the proofs are relegated to the
Appendix.
2 Literature
There is a wide debate on net neutrality, involving lawyers, engineers and economists, that
has only recently been formally analyzed from an economic perspective.8 Departing from
network neutrality could allow service tiering by ISPs, i.e., provision to CPs of diﬀerent
network qualities for diﬀerent prices. This is often advocated as a way to allow ISPs to better
deal with congestion. Hermalin and Katz (2007) study the desirability of a discriminatory
regime. When net neutrality is imposed, an ISP is forced to oﬀer a unique quality to all
content providers. When an ISP is free to discriminate, more attractive contents purchase
higher quality. Compared to the unregulated model, welfare can increase or decrease under
8See Lee and Wu (2009) for a discussion on the economic issues concerning net neutrality. See Schuett
(2010) and Krämer et al. (2012) for a review of the literature.
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net neutrality. The authors argue that these eﬀects are often negative.9Choi and Kim (2010)
show that investment incentives by a monopolist ISP can be either higher or lower in the
discriminatory regime than with net neutrality, since capacity expansion decreases the value
of the scarce resource, i.e. the fast line.10 Bourreau, Kourandi and Valletti (2012) study a
similar issue in a model with two competing ISPs. Under discrimination, ISPs have larger
investment incentives, more content providers are active and there is less congestion. Hence,
the discriminatory regime is welfare superior to the net neutrality regime. Economides and
Hermalin (2012) show a result that we also ﬁnd: the preferred conﬁguration from a welfare
point of view is the one where more contents are delivered to consumers. Diﬀerently from
Bourreau, Kourandi and Valletti (2012), departing from net neutrality through a tiering
service can either increase or decrease total content sent, and then welfare.11 In the long
run, they also show, contrary to Choi and Kim (2010), that departing from net neutrality
unambiguously increases the incentives of the ISP to invest in the bandwidth. However, the
net welfare eﬀect, taking into account dynamic and static eﬀects, is not a priori clear. The
authors show that, when consumer surplus weighs a lot on total welfare, net neutrality is
welfare-enhancing.
These papers focus on service tiering, while we consider net neutrality as a zero price rule
on the content side. In our paper, without net neutrality, ISPs are allowed to impose fees
to CPs which want to reach their consumers. Economides and Tag (2012) use this deﬁnition
of net neutrality and concentrate on the pricing issue linked to the two-sidedness of the
market that could arise due to a departure from net neutrality. Considering a duopoly of
ISPs, they ﬁnd that, when content providers value consumers more than consumers value
contents, welfare increases under net neutrality, since the platform internalizes cross-group
externalities. On the contrary, consumer surplus always decreases, since competition for
consumers is less intense under net neutrality than when cross-group externalities are taken
into account by the platform in the two-sided model under no regulation. Also Musacchio,
Schwartz and Walrand (2009) analyze a similar issue in a model where ISPs and CPs can
9Choi, Jeon and Kim (2012) study a similar issue with two interconnected ISPs. They show that the
advantage of net neutrality regulation crucially depends on the business model of the content providers, since
this aﬀects the quality level provided under diﬀerent regimes.
10Choi and Kim (2010) also study the incentives of CPs to invest in content quality: the incentive to invest
of the high-speed content depends on its ability to exploit the fast line and on its bargaining power, while
the rival content always invests less under the discriminatory regime.
11Both Bourreau, Kourandi and Valletti (2012) and Economides and Hermalin (2012) model a continuum
of CPs with a diﬀerent sensitivity to congestion. Economides and Hermalin (2012) also take into account the
elasticity of consumers’ demand with respect to the transmission time. They conclude that welfare increases
when the delay times are shorter for contents with greater elasticities of demand with respect to transmission
time. Remark that more time sensitive contents need not to be the contents with the highest elasticity. Thus,
in their model, prioritizing these contents could entail a loss of welfare.
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also invest. They ﬁnd that net neutrality can be either welfare superior or inferior to the
unregulated regime.
As mentioned in the Introduction, previous papers on net neutrality model proﬁtability
of content providers as an exogenous parameter. In contrast, we derive it endogenously,
as a result of CPs’ competition on the advertising market. Moreover, these models do not
consider the segmentation issue that could arise when net neutrality is removed (see Lee and
Wu, 2009). Indeed, a CP can sell the attention of exclusive consumers to advertisers for a
higher price than the attention of non-exclusive consumers (see Ambrus and Reisinger, 2006,
Calvano and Jullien, 2011, and Anderson, Foros and Kind, 2011). As a consequence, some
contents could be accessible from an ISP but not from the other.12
In an independently developed paper, Kourandi et al. (2013) also consider the fragmen-
tation issue. Although the main question they investigate is essentially the same as we do,
there are some important diﬀerences between the two approaches and the results we found.
First of all, their main focus is on exclusive contracts among ISPs and CPs. In contrast,
we study how fragmentation can result from allowing ISPs to set simple non-discriminatory
access fees. Kourandi et al. also include a termination fee, but they assume it is the same for
all ISPs and exogenous. Thus, our approach investigates the link between pricing regulation
and Internet fragmentation in a diﬀerent (and, in a sense, more direct) way. We argue that,
short of making use of exclusivity contracts, ISPs can induce a given conﬁguration of the
network by strategically setting the access fee.13 Secondly, in our model, once ISPs have set
the access fees, connection decisions are made simultaneously by CPs. In Kourandi et al.,
ISPs contract sequentially with CPs for exclusivity. Third, the interpretation of net neutral-
ity slightly diﬀers among the two papers. In our paper, net neutrality means that access fees
are restricted to zero. In Kourandi et al. (2013) net neutrality entails either zero termination
fees or zero termination fees and zero-transfers for exclusive contracts. Finally, we explicitly
model the advertisers side of the market. Kourandi et al. assume that the revenue per im-
pression for exclusive consumers is higher than for non-exclusive ones. However, they do not
model the forces behind this equilibrium outcome.
The diﬀerences mentioned above are relevant for the results. Diﬀerently fromKourandi
et al., we ﬁnd that universal connection is always an equilibrium under net neutrality. The
diﬀerence comes from the diﬀerent way in which the negotiation stage is modeled under net
neutrality. More precisely, we assume that with net neutrality ISPs have no instrument to
12Bourreau, Kourandi and Valletti (2012), Economides and Hermalin (2012) and Hermalin and Katz (2007)
evaluate how many content providers are active in equilibrium under diﬀerent regulatory regimes.
13Kourandi et al. (2013) also restrict the set of possible network conﬁgurations: they rule out cases in
which both CPs join only one ISP. We instead consider this case: even if it never arises in equilibrium, it
does aﬀect the equilibrium outcomes in the unregulated regime.
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inﬂuence CPs’ connections decisions. On the contrary, Kourandi et al. use a sequential
negotiation for exclusive contracts, and a CP that has signed an exclusivity contract with an
ISP cannot connect to the rival, even with net neutrality. Furthermore, ﬁndings concerning
the role of content value and complementarity are quite divergent: for instance, they ﬁnd
that complementarity makes total fragmentation (resp. universal connection) more (less)
likely in the unregulated regime. We ﬁnd the opposite. Finally, Kourandi et al. ﬁnd, unlike
us, that universal distribution and net neutrality are not necessarily socially desirable. This
diﬀerence is due to the fact that we take explicitly into consideration advertiser surplus when
computing total welfare.
3 The Model
3.1 Setup
We consider a setting with two Internet Service Providers (ISPs), indexed by i = A,B,
and two Content Providers (CPs), indexed by j = 0, 1. An ISP is a platform connecting
consumers to CPs, and a CP is a platform connecting consumers to advertisers. Obviously,
a CP needs to be connected to at least one ISP in order to be able to reach consumers.
Moreover, each CP reaches only consumers of the ISP it is connected to. ISPs and CPs are
independent ﬁrms.
We compare connection choices made by ﬁrms in two alternative regulatory regimes: one
in which network neutrality regulation is in place and one in which it is not, referred to as
the unregulated regime. In the former case, ISPs have to grant access to their network to
all CPs for free: we consider net neutrality as a zero-price rule for CPs (see, e.g., Schuett,
2010). In the latter, ISPs can impose an access fee to CPs.
Internet Service Providers. ISPs are located at the extremes of a Hotelling line: ISP
i = A is located at point 0 and ISP i = B at point 1. ISP i sets a subscription fee ai for
consumers who want to join its network. In the unregulated regime, ISP i also sets an access
fee Fi for CPs that want to reach its consumers. Fi is exclusionary: a CP can access ISP i’s
consumer base only if agrees to pay it.14 In the net neutrality regime, CPs can freely access
both ISPs, hence Fi = 0. All fees are non-discriminatory and non-contingent. The proﬁt
function of ISP i is
πi = aiqi +
∑
j=0,1
FiIij i = A,B
14There is no a priori restriction on the sign of access fees. However, they always turn out to be positive
in equilibrium, as we show below.
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where qi is the number of consumers connected to ISP i and Iij is an indicator function, such
that Iij = 1 if CP j acquires access to ISP i’s consumers and Iij = 0 otherwise. More details
on this function are provided below.
Consumers. There is a large mass (normalized to one) of consumers uniformly distributed
on the interval [0, 1]. Consumers connect to one and only one ISP.15The utility Ui a consumer
located in x ∈ [0, 1] gets from connecting to ISP i is
Ui (x) = Z +Δi − t |x− li| − ai i = A,B (1)
where Z is the gross surplus from accessing the Internet, assumed large enough that all
consumers connect to an ISP. t is the transportation cost on the Hotelling line, i.e. the
disutility for consumer x from not consuming its preferred speciﬁcation of the product. li
represents the ISP’s position on the Hotelling line, so lA = 0 and lB = 1. Δi represents the
utility consumers get from browsing contents available on ISP i. We assume the following
Δi =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
0 if no CP is available on ISP i
δ if one CP is available on ISP i
δ (1 + γ) if both are available
with δ, γ ≥ 0. The term δ represents the utility consumers obtain from accessing a single
content, while δγ captures the extra utility of accessing an additional one. Hence, δ can be
interpreted as the value consumers attribute to content availability in absolute terms, while
γ represents the degree of complementarity among the two contents. We do not assume
any a priori diﬀerence among contents and we allow them to be either substitutes (γ < 1),
complements (γ > 1) or independent (γ = 1). A priori, all of these cases can occur in
reality. For example, two newspaper websites could be substitute contents. Contents such as
VoIP and email services could instead be complementary. We do not endogenize consumers’
demand for contents and simply assume that each consumer visits all available contents
once.16 We also ignore any (dis)utility from ads. We assume that the market is covered and
that the demand for each ISP is positive, i.e.
∑
i qi = 1 and qi > 0 ∀i.17
15We assume consumers subscribe to just one platform to access the Internet, as is currently the most
widespread practice. It is however conceivable that consumers might multi-home if platforms provide access
to diﬀerent contents. Our results still hold if the number of multi-homing consumers is not too large.
16More precisely, we assume that each consumer visits all available contents a given number of times N ,
that we assume without loss of generality to be equal to 1. This same assumption is used by, e.g., Bourreau
et al. (2012), Choi et al. (2012) and Krämer and Weiwiorra (2012).
17The assumption of covered market is instead dropped in the case of a monopolist ISP.
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Net consumer surplus (CS ) can be computed as
CS =
ˆ qA
0
(Z +ΔA − tx− aA) dx+
ˆ 1
qA
(Z +ΔB − t (1− x)− aB) dx
that can be written as
CS = Z +
∑
i=A,B
(Δi − ai) qi + t
2
− tqB − tq2A
Content Providers. Each CP provides free contents to consumers but charges advertisers
that place ads on its platform. A CP j charges a per-impression price pj to an advertiser if
and only if a consumer is exposed to the ad while browsing its content. We assume there is
no cost of providing ad spaces and that CPs set a uniform price for advertisers. We assume
each visit by a consumer on a given content brings to an impression. Hence, the volume of
impressions for an ad put on CP j is equal to qj, which is the number of consumers connected
to the ISPs distributing j’s content, i.e.
qj =
∑
i=A,B
qiIij j = 0, 1
The proﬁt of CP j is
πj = djpjqj −
∑
i=A,B
FiIij j = 0, 1
where dj is the number of advertisers on CP j.
A CP can connect to either no ISP, only one or both. CPs make connection decisions by
comparing proﬁts under all network conﬁgurations, taking as given the couple (FA, FB) and
the decision of the rival CP. We assume that, if a CP is indiﬀerent between joining or not
an ISP, it joins it. A given network conﬁguration arises at equilibrium when no CP ﬁnds a
proﬁtable unilateral deviation.
Advertisers. There is a mass of size one of advertisers interested in reaching consumers
by means of CPs. Their willingness to pay for ad slots crucially depends on the probability
that consumers will be impressed with their ads. In turn, this depends on the number of
outlets an advertiser can use to reach a given consumer. V ′ denotes the gross surplus (i.e.
the increase in the expected value of sales due to the consumer seeing the ad) produced by
reaching a consumer through a single CP. We denote by V ′′ the additional gross surplus
produced by reaching the same consumer through an additional content.
Recent literature on online advertising suggests that ads seen multiple times are par-
10
tially wasteful (Calvano and Jullien, 2011), since they reach already informed consumers and
are therefore squandered together with their attention.18 Therefore, we make the following
assumption:
V
′ ≥ V ′′ ≥ 0
Let us now provide a micro foundation for this assumption. Assume that each advertiser
is a monopolist producer of a diﬀerentiated good of quality k. Per each good, there exists a
fraction α of consumers with willingness-to-pay equal to k > 0, while the rest has valuation
zero. All consumers are impressed with all ads placed on a content when visiting it. Since
each producer has monopoly power, it imposes a price equal to k, that is, a price that extracts
all consumer surplus. When (and only when) a consumer with a positive valuation for the
good is informed about it, she buys it. The consumer is informed when she is impressed with
an ad she pays attention to. There is a probability β ∈ [0, 1] that a consumer pays attention
to an ad when impressed.19 Hence, the expected value of impressing a consumer with an ad
for the ﬁrst time is:
V
′
= kαβ
Since consumers visit all available content once (by assumption), V ′ is the value of reaching
the consumer through a single content. A consumer can be impressed by the same ad for a
second time while visiting another content. The expected value of impressing the consumer
for a second time is
V
′′
= kα (1− β) β
that is, the expected value given that the consumer did not pay attention when impressed
for the ﬁrst time (note that an impression which the consumer has already paid attention to
has no value since the consumer is already informed). Clearly, V ′ ≥ V ′′ . In the following, we
will use the reduced form for the gross utility of an advertising slot for advertisers.
A CP j sells ads at a uniform per-impression price pj.20 Advertisers can buy ad spaces
from none, one or both CPs. We assume that, if advertisers are indiﬀerent between joining
a CP or not, they join it. Suppose an advertiser multi-homes, buying ad space from both
content providers. Its total surplus would be
V
′ ⋃
j=0,1
qj + V
′′ ⋂
j=0,1
qj −
∑
j=0,1
pjqj
18Athey et al. (2012) estimate that more than two thirds of the ads in large campaigns are wasted, hitting
the same receivers more than 10 times.
19We here follow Anderson and Coate (2005) and Ambrus and Reisinger (2006).
20We assume that there is no across-outlet tracking. Hence, a CP has no knowledge on whether a given
consumer has already been impressed with the ad while browsing the rival’s content or not. This means that
prices pj cannot be discriminated accordingly.
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where
⋃
j=0,1 qj denotes the mass of consumers accessing at least one content and
⋂
j=0,1 qj
denotes the number of consumers that access both contents. Given the assumptions taken
above, each consumer that access at least a CP (
⋃
j=0,1 qj) is impressed at least once by each
ad. Consumers that access both CPs (
⋂
j=0,1 qj) are impressed twice. Suppose instead the
advertiser single-homes, buying an ad space only from CP j. Its total surplus would be
(
V
′ − pj
)
qj j = 0, 1
Obviously, the surplus is zero if no ad space is bought. Taking as given the network con-
ﬁguration and prices pj, the advertiser will choose the option that guarantees the highest
surplus. We may therefore compute total advertisers surplus as
AS =
∑
j=0,1
dsj
(
V
′ − pj
)
qj + dm
(
V
′ ⋃
j=0,1
qj + V
′′ ⋂
j=0,1
qj −
∑
j=0,1
pjqj
)
where dsj is the number of advertisers that single-home on CP j and dm is the number of
advertisers that multi-home.
Welfare. We deﬁne social welfare SW as the sum of consumer surplus, advertisers surplus
and proﬁts of ISPs and CPs. Thus
SW = CS + AS +
∑
i=A,B
πi +
∑
j=0,1
πj
It is intuitive that social welfare coincides with the gross surplus generated by connections at
the two ends of the market, i.e. with the sum of gross surplus for consumers and advertisers.
Indeed, payments collected by ISPs and CPs are simply transfers from other players and
cancel out in SW. Replacing CS, AS,
∑
i=A,B πi and
∑
j=0,1 πj in SW , we get
SW = Z +
∑
i=A,B
Δi +
t
2
− tqB − tq2A +
∑
j=0,1
dsjV
′
qj + dm
(
V
′ ⋃
j=0,1
qj + V
′′ ⋂
j=0,1
qj
)
We can conclude the following
Lemma 1 Universal connection and advertisers multi-homing are socially optimal.
PROOF: The fact that each CP is connected to both ISPs implies that qj = 1 ∀j, as
consumers have access to all contents, irrespectively of the ISP they subscribe to. It also
implies that qA = qB = 1/2, hence total transport cost t2 − tqB − tq2A is minimized. SW is
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strictly increasing in
∑
i=A,B Δi, which is maximized when Iij = 1 ∀i, j. It is also optimal
to have all advertisers multi-home, since SW increases in the number of ad impressions to
consumers. 
Timing and deﬁnition of equilibrium. The timing of the game is as follows:
1. In the unregulated regime, ISP A and B simultaneously set access fees Fi. In the net
neutrality regime, Fi is restricted to zero. Having observed fees Fi, CPs simultaneously
decide which ISP to connect to (if any).
2. ISP A and B simultaneously set subscription fees ai. CPs simultaneously set (per-
impression) prices pj for their ad spaces. Advertisers buy ad spaces from CPs.
3. Consumers connect to their preferred ISP and visit the available CPs, getting exposed
to the ads.
We now provide the deﬁnition of an equilibrium in our game. A subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the game is a set of fees, prices, connection decisions and demands such that, at each
stage, no player wants to deviate given the choice of other players and what has been decided
at previous stages. We assume all agents have perfect foresight. The model is solved by
backward induction.
A remark is in order at this point. In a standard two-sided market framework, it may
occur that ISPs cut subscription fees in order to attract more consumers and exploit network
externalities on the content side. The timing we assume rules this out, since price competition
for consumers comes at a later stage with respect to competition for contents. Hence, ISPs
take revenues collected on the content side as given when deciding on subscription fees. We
believe this to be a reasonable simpliﬁcation, justiﬁed by the fact that contracts between
ISPs and CPs have generally a more long-run perspective and their connection decision is
more rigid than that between ISPs and consumers.21
4 ISP monopoly
In order to understand the forces at work in the model, we start from a scenario in which
only one ISP (say, A) is active. We simply disregard the presence of ISP B. To describe in
a concise way the network conﬁgurations that may arise in equilibrium, we now introduce
some notation. In the following, network conﬁguration (0A, 1A) means that both 0 and 1
connect to A (i.e. IAj = 1 ∀j): we refer to this conﬁguration (in the monopoly scenario) as
21A similar assumption is made by Choi et al. (2012) and Kourandi et al. (2013).
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Figure 1: Monopoly setup and possible conﬁgurations
“universal connection”; (0A, 1N) means that 0 connects to A and 1 connects to no ISP (i.e.
IA0 = 1 IA1 = 0); (0N, 1N) means that no CP connects to any ISP. See Figure 1 below for
an illustration.
4.1 Stage 3
At Stage 3, consumers decide whether to connect to ISP A or stay out of the market. Indeed,
only consumers that are suﬃciently close to A (i.e. with low x) participate in the market.22 To
compute consumers’ demand, we deﬁne the marginal consumer x who is indiﬀerent between
connecting to ISP A and not accessing the Internet at all. From equation UA (x) = 0, we
ﬁnd
x =
Z +ΔA − aA
t
Demand for ISP A is given by all consumers who get positive utility from connecting to the
ISP, that is qA = x.
4.2 Stage 2
At Stage 2, ISP A decides the subscription fee aA maximizing proﬁts. ISP A’s proﬁts are
πA = qAaA +
∑
j FAIAj, where qA = x. Using the ﬁrst order condition
∂πA
∂aA
= 0, we ﬁnd
22We here relax the assumption that all market is covered.
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a∗Amon =
Z +ΔA
2
By substitution, we obtain equilibrium demand and proﬁt:23
q∗Amon =
Z +ΔA
2t
π∗Amon =
(Z +ΔA)
2
4t
+
∑
j
FAIAj
Not surprisingly, both subscription fee and demand are increasing in ΔA and Z, and demand
is decreasing in t. Hence, taking access fee FA as given, proﬁts are increasing in Z and ΔA,
and decreasing in t.
At this Stage, CPs also set prices for advertising spaces. In order to understand how
prices are formed, it is useful to recall how much reaching consumers is worth to advertisers.
The expected value of reaching a consumer through an ad on CP j exclusively is V ′ . If the
advertiser reaches the same consumer also on CP j′ exposing the consumer to the ad twice,
the additional impression is worth (in expected terms) V ′′ . If a content provider has exclusive
access to consumers attention, it can always charge monopoly prices for ad spaces. On the
contrary, if multiple CPs reach the same consumer, competition to attract advertisers brings
to lower prices, as in a standard oligopoly model (Ambrus, Calvano and Reisinger, 2011, and
Anderson, Foros and Kind, 2011).24
To illustrate, suppose to be in the universal distribution conﬁguration. We now argue
that the equilibrium is such that CPs charge a per-impression price pj = V
′′
j = 0, 1 and
advertisers multi-home. To see why, consider that a higher price could proﬁtably be undercut
by the rival CP, winning it the entire market. This is because advertisers would optimally
single-home on the cheapest outlet. On the other hand, there is no point in charging less than
V
′′ . This is because advertisers would anyway multi-home, since the price per impression
is lower than the value of an additional impression V ′′ . Hence, the price in the competitive
case is equal to the value of reaching a consumer through an additional channel. Suppose,
instead, CP j were the only one available to subscribers at ISP A. It can set a per-impression
price pj = V
′ , capturing the entire advertiser gross surplus. Obviously, advertisers join only
the CP with a positive market share.
The above discussion introduces us to Lemma 2, presenting CPs’ proﬁts at Stage 2. We
provide in its proof a more formal and complete description of how ad space prices are
determined.
23Since we have assumed 1 ≥ q∗Amon > 0, this implies that we assume δ (1 + γ) ≤ 2t− Z holds.
24This crucially depends on multi-homing by advertisers and the loss in value of repeated impressions. If
multiple impressions did not lose value, competition among CPs would have no impact on prices of ad spaces.
If multi-homing of advertisers were not possible, the equilibrium price would be equal to the marginal cost
of providing ad spaces, which is zero by assumption.
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Lemma 2 In equilibrium, advertisers buy ad slots from all CPs that have access to con-
sumers. Advertising proﬁts πj of CP j, conditionally on its connection status, are reported
in the following table
π1
π0
A No
A V
′′
q++mon − FA
V
′′
q++mon − FA
0
V
′
q+mon − FA
No V
′
q+mon − FA
0
0
0
where q++mon =
Z+δ(1+γ)
2t
and q+mon =
Z+δ
2t
Table 1: Monopoly model: advertising proﬁts πj of CP j, conditionally on its connection
status.
PROOF: We consider each possible market conﬁguration in turn. Consider ﬁrst the
universal distribution case. Thus, qj = qA = q++mon j = 0, 1. Suppose an advertiser puts
ads on both CPs. Its total surplus would be
(
V
′
+ V
′′ −∑j=0,1 pj) q++mon. Suppose instead
the advertiser decides to put ads only on CP j. Its total surplus is
(
V
′ − pj
)
q++mon since, in
this case, consumers are exposed only to ﬁrst impressions. This implies that an advertiser
prefers to put ads on both CPs rather than on one if and only if V ′′ ≥ pj. We now prove that
pj = V
′′
j = 0, 1 is the equilibrium price schedule for advertising spaces and that advertisers
multi-home. Suppose pj′ ≤ V ′′ : as long as pj ≤ V ′′ advertisers would optimally multi-home
and put ads on both CPs, while if pj > V
′′ no platform would join CP j. Hence, it is optimal
for CP j to set pj = V
′′ . Suppose instead that pj′ > V
′′ : then, it is optimal for j to set
pj = pj′ − ε. By so doing, all advertisers would single-home and buy only ad slots from j,
leaving the other CP with zero revenues. It follows that the only equilibrium prices (mutual
best response) are such that pj = V
′′
j = 0, 1. It is easily seen that, in such equilibrium,
all advertisers multi-home. Finally, each CP makes a proﬁt equal to V ′′q++mon − FA.
Suppose now the market conﬁguration involved exclusion, i.e. either (0A,1N) or (0N,1A).
For instance, consider conﬁguration (0A,1N). If an advertiser puts ads on both CPs, its total
surplus is
(
V
′ −∑j=0,1 pj) q+mon. If ads are put only on CP 0, the surplus is (V ′ − p0) q+mon.
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If instead ads are put only on CP 1, the surplus is 0 − p1. We now prove that CPs set the
following equilibrium prices: p1 = 0 and p0 = V
′ . Indeed, as CP 1 does not provide any
surplus to advertisers (since it is not able to reach consumers), they never join its platform
for any positive price. Instead, CP 0 has no incentive to ﬁx any price lower than V ′ , since
advertisers join this platform for a price up to this value. Hence, CP 1’s proﬁts are π1 = 0
and CP 0’s proﬁts are π0 = V
′
q+mon − FA.
Trivially, when no CP is connected, no advertising takes place. Hence, all proﬁts are zero.

4.3 Stage 1
At stage 1, ISP A sets the access fee FA and CPs decide whether to connect. This determines
the network conﬁguration. We now present the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. We
begin from the benchmark case of net neutrality, where the access fee is constrained to
zero. Next, we consider the unregulated scenario, in which ISP A freely sets FA. In the
following, we denote with superscript N the equilibrium variables under net neutrality, and
with superscript U those under the unregulated regime.
4.3.1 Benchmark: net neutrality regime
In the network neutrality case, ISP proﬁts are simply given by revenues collected from sub-
scription fees on the consumers’ market
πNAmon =
(Z +ΔA)
2
4t
since FNA = 0
We now study CPs’ connection decisions, and derive the corresponding conﬁguration of the
network. Elaboration from the table provided in Lemma 2 leads to the following
Proposition 1 Suppose there is a single ISP. In the net neutrality regime there exists a
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium entailing universal distribution (i.e. where the market
conﬁguration is (0A,1A)). It is such that
aNAmon =
Z + δ (1 + γ)
2
qNA = q
N
j =
Z + δ (1 + γ)
2t
pNj = V
′′
INAj = 1 ∀j
PROOF: Immediate from Lemma 2, when Fi = 0.
Under net neutrality, universal connection is the unique equilibrium. Observe, however,
that when both CPs are connected to the monopolist ISP, they cannot charge the monopoly
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price V ′ for ad slots. Each CP would be better oﬀ if the rival were excluded from the market.
Yet, since connection is free, this never takes place in equilibrium.
4.3.2 Unregulated regime
In the unregulated regime, ISP A is allowed to impose an access fee FA to CPs. The following
Proposition presents the subgame-perfect equilibria in this regime:
Proposition 2 Suppose there is a single ISP. In the unregulated regime:
• if and only if the value of second ad impressions is high enough, i.e.
V
′′ ≥
(
V
′Z + δ
2
− δγ (2Z + 2δ + δγ)
4
)
1
Z + δ (1 + γ)
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium entailing universal distribution (i.e. market
conﬁguration (0A,1A)). It is such that
FUA = V
′′
q++mon a
U
A =
Z + δ (1 + γ)
2
qUA = q
U
j = q
++
mon =
Z + δ (1 + γ)
2t
pUj = V
′′
IUAj = 1 ∀j
• if and only if the value of second ad impressions is low enough, i.e. if
0 < V
′′
<
(
V
′Z + δ
2
− δγ (2Z + 2δ + δγ)
4
)
1
Z + δ (1 + γ)
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium entailing exclusion of one CP (i.e. market
conﬁguration (0A,1N) or (ON,1A)). It is such that
FUA = V
′
q+mon a
U
i =
Z + δ
2
qUA = q
U
j = q
+
mon =
Z + δ
2t
pUj = V
′ ∑
j=0,1
IUAj = 1 ∀j
PROOF: see the Appendix. 
Diﬀerently from the net neutrality regime, the ISP can inﬂuence the network conﬁguration
by setting the access fee. Depending on parameter values, the equilibrium is either such that
both content providers connect to the ISP or that only one does. Since competition reduces
the proﬁts a CP can obtain on the advertising market, each is ready to pay a premium
for being the only outlet to reach consumers. By setting a high access fee (equal to V ′per
consumer reached), the ISP discourages one CP from connecting to its network. At the same
time, it extracts the high proﬁts made by the CP that does connect. On the other hand, since
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Figure 2: Monopoly, equilibria in the unregulated regime: the blue line represents threshold(
V
′ Z+δ
2
− δγ(2Z+2δ+δγ)
4
)
1
Z+δ(1+γ)
. UC stands for Universal Connection and E for Exclusion.
Graphs are obtained setting δ = 0.5 and γ = 1.
the attractiveness of its platform is reduced, the high access fee also implies the ISP renounces
to a share of consumers (who subscribe only if multiple contents are available). Alternatively,
the ISP can choose a lower fee (i.e. equal to the value of a second impression V ′′per each
consumer), inducing universal connection. Hence, the surplus per consumer extracted from
each CP is lower, but the consumer base is maximized. Moreover, the access fee is collected
from both CPs.
We see therefore that the equilibrium crucially depends on the value of ﬁrst and repeated
ad impressions, V ′ and V ′′ , as well as on the attractiveness of content for consumers. If
ads lose little value when repeated (i.e. V ′′ is close enough to V ′), CPs have a substantial
willingness to pay for connection even if they have to compete for consumers’ attention.
Hence, the ISP prefers to induce universal connection. Otherwise, the ISP induces total
fragmentation. Figure 2 shows the equilibria conditionally on the values of V ′′and V ′ .
Finally, we see that the value of contents for consumers and their complementarity induce
the ISP to attract more CPs. This is easily explained: if contents are valuable and not highly
substitutable (i.e. both δ and γ are high enough), the loss of consumer base when excluding a
content is signiﬁcant. It follows that the ISP is better oﬀ attracting both content providers.
If instead δ and γ are low enough, excluding a CP has a small cost in terms of foregone
consumer subscriptions.
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4.4 Comparison of the two regulatory regimes
Let us now brieﬂy compare the two regulatory regimes with a monopolist ISP. While CPs
are always universally distributed under net neutrality, one of them might be excluded from
the network in the unregulated regime. However, the results also indicate that, by itself, the
removal of net neutrality is not suﬃcient to produce exclusion of content. Exclusion crucially
depends on how much consumers value content availability and on how competition among
CPs aﬀects proﬁtability of advertising spaces.
The above has very intuitive welfare implications. Consumers are always better oﬀ with
universal connection than with exclusion, since they have access to more contents. Advertisers
are also better oﬀ under universal distribution, since the number of ad impressions increases
and their price goes down. Consequently, consumers and advertisers are strictly better oﬀ
with net neutrality, as long as advertising spaces strongly lose proﬁtability in the presence of
competition. Otherwise, consumers and advertisers are indiﬀerent between the two regulatory
regimes, since universal connection will emerge regardless. On the other hand, CPs are
strictly better oﬀ under net neutrality, since under the unregulated regime all their proﬁts
are extracted by the ISP. For the same reason, the ISP is better oﬀ under the unregulated
regime. Finally, since social welfare depends essentially on the gross surplus at both ends of
the market, we conclude that society as a whole is weakly better oﬀ under net neutrality.
5 ISP duopoly
Let us now move to the fully-ﬂedged version of the model, where both ISPs are active on the
market. Following the notation introduced in Section 4, network conﬁguration (0AB, 1AB)
will here mean that 0 connects to both A and B and 1 connects to both A and B (i.e.
Iij = 1 ∀i, j); we refer to this conﬁguration, where all CPs are connected to all ISPs, as
“universal connection”. (0A, 1B) means that 0 connects only to A and so does 1 (i.e. IA0 =
IB1 = 1 IA1 = IB0 = 0): we refer to this conﬁguration, where each ISP provides exclusive
access to a single (diﬀerent) CP, as “total fragmentation”. (0A, 1AB) means that 0 connects
to ISP A and 1 connects to both: we refer to this conﬁguration where a CP joins only one
ISP, while the other CP joins both ISPs as “partial fragmentation”. Finally, (0N, 1AB) means
that 0 connects to no ISP and 1 connects to both A and B, (IA1 = IB1 = 1 IA0 = IB0 = 0).
Similar notation is used for all other conﬁgurations. See Figure 3 for an illustration.
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Figure 3: Duopoly setup and network conﬁgurations
5.1 Stage 3
At Stage 3, consumers choose which ISP they connect to, maximizing their utility and taking
as given the CPs available at each ISP i and subscription fees ai. In order to compute
demands, we determine the marginal consumer x who is indiﬀerent between the two ISPs.
Equalizing UA (x) = UB (x) and solving for x we ﬁnd
x =
1
2
+
(ΔA −ΔB)− (aA − aB)
2t
The demand for ISP A is given by all consumers to the left of x on the Hotelling line, while
that for ISP B is given by all consumers to its right. That is, qA = x and qB = 1− x.
5.2 Stage 2
At Stage 2, ISPs simultaneously set subscription fees, maximizing their proﬁts. They do
so taking as given access fees Fi as well as CPs’ connection decisions (set at Stage 1), and
anticipating consumers’ behavior at Stage 3. Equilibrium fees are obtained as the solution
to the system of ﬁrst order conditions ∂πi
∂ai
= 0 i = A,B. The result, for any network
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conﬁguration, is
a∗i = t+
(Δi −Δi′)
3
i = A,B i′ = i
Replacing a∗i in qi and πi, we get demands and proﬁts25
q∗i =
1
2
+
(Δi −Δi′)
6t
π∗i =
(3t+Δi −Δi′)2
18t
+
∑
j=0,1
IijFi i = A,B i
′ = i
Proﬁts of platform i are increasing in (Δi −Δi′). Thus, a uniform increase in quality of both
platforms leaves proﬁts unchanged.
In order to describe in a brief way the equilibrium demands conditional on the values of
Δi −Δi′ , we introduce some additional notation, summarized in Table 2 below:
Δi −Δi′ q∗i deﬁned as Δi −Δi′ q∗i deﬁned as
−δ1 12 − δ6t q−−i δ1 12 + δ6t q++i
−δ2 12 − δγ6t q−i δ2 12 + δγ6t q+i
0 1
2
0 1
2
− (δ1 + δ2) 12 − δ(1+γ)6t q−−−i δ1 + δ2 12 + δ(1+γ)6t q+++i
Table 2: Notation for demand of ISP i, duopoly case.
CPs set prices for ad spaces in the same way as in the monopoly case of Section 4.
However, we can now ﬁnd situations where a CP is the unique gatekeeper only for a part of
consumers connected to the Internet (the remaining part being reached also by the other CP).
In this case, as we formally show in Lemma 3, prices for ad spaces are a weighted average
of the value of ﬁrst impression V ′ and second impression V ′′ , the weights being respectively
the demand of subscribers who visit only one CP and the demand of subscribers who visit
both CPs. Lemma 3 presents CP proﬁts at Stage 2.
Lemma 3 All advertisers multi-home at equilibrium. Proﬁts πj of CP j=0,1, conditional
on the network conﬁguration, are as reported in the following table
25Since we have assumed
∑
q∗i = 1 and q∗i > 0 ∀i, this implies that we assume δ (1 + γ) < 3t holds.
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π1
π0
A&B A B None
A&B V
′′ −∑Fi
V
′′ −∑Fi V
′′
q+ − FA
V
′′
q+ + V
′
q− −∑Fi V
′′
q+ − FB
V
′′
q+ + V
′
q− −∑Fi 0V ′ −∑Fi
A V
′′
q+ + V
′
q− −∑Fi
V
′′
q+ − FA
V
′′
q+++ − FA
V
′′
q+++ − FA
V
′
2
− FB
V
′
2
− FA
0
V
′
q++ − FA
B V
′′
q+ + V
′
q− −∑Fi
V
′′
q+ − FA
V
′
2
− FA
V
′
2
− FB
V
′′
q+++ − FB
V
′′
q+++ − FB
0
V
′
q++ − FB
None V
′ −∑Fi
0
V
′
q++ − FA
0
V
′
q++ − FB
0
0
0
Table 3: Duopoly model: advertising proﬁts πj of CP j , conditionally on connection status.
PROOF: We consider each of the possible market conﬁgurations in turn. First, consider
universal distribution. If an advertiser puts ads on both CPs, its total surplus would be
V
′
+ V
′′ − p0 − p1. If instead ads are put only on CP i, the surplus is V ′ − pi. The
discussion concerning this conﬁguration is the same as the one in the proof of Lemma 2 for
the conﬁguration (0A,1A).
Suppose now the market conﬁguration involves partial fragmentation. For instance, con-
sider the case (0AB,1A). If an advertiser puts ads on both CPs, its total surplus would be(
V
′ − p0
)
q− +
(
V
′
+ V
′′ − p0 − p1
)
q+. If instead ads are put only on CP 0, the surplus is
V
′ − p0. Finally, if ads are put only on CP 1, its surplus is
(
V
′ − p1
)
q+. We now prove that
ISPs set the following equilibrium prices: p1 = V
′′ and p0 = V
′
q− + V
′′
q+ and that adver-
tisers multi-home. Let us start by describing the best response function for CP 0. Suppose
p1 ≤ V ′′ . In that case, advertisers would buy ad spaces from CP 1, irrespectively of whether
they have already bought ads from CP 0 or not, since price is surely below the value of a
repeated impression. If they put ads on CP 1, however, they will also put them on CP 0 only
if p0 is low enough, i.e. only if(
V
′ − p0
)
q− +
(
V
′
+ V
′′ − p0 − p1
)
q+ ≥
(
V
′ − p1
)
q+
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which results in p0 ≤ V ′q− + V ′′q+. It follows that the best response for CP 0 is to set
p0 = V
′
q− + V
′′
q+ (otherwise, CP 0 would not be able to sell any ad space). Suppose now
p1 > V
′′ : in that case, advertisers putting ads on CP 0, would never put them on CP 1, the
price being too high. This rules out multi-homing, so all advertisers put ads either on CP 0
or CP 1. Clearly, CP 0 is better oﬀ being the player capturing all the market. This happens
if and only if (
V
′ − p0
)
≥
(
V
′ − p1
)
q+
holds. As a consequence, the best response is p0 = V
′
q− + p1q+.
Let us now describe the best response function for CP 1. Suppose ﬁrst that p0 ≤ V ′q− +
V
′′
q+. Advertisers multi-home if and only if p1 ≤ V ′′ . Otherwise, they all converge on one
of the two CPs. However, if p1 > V
′′ , this CP is 0, as condition
(
V
′ − p0
)
≥
(
V
′ − p1
)
q+
is holds. It follows that the best response is p1 = V
′′ . Suppose now that p0 > V
′
q− + V
′′
q+.
p0 is suﬃciently high for CP 1 to be able to capture all the market while still setting a higher
price than V ′′ . Indeed, it can easily be veriﬁed that condition
(
V
′ − p0
)
≤
(
V
′ − p1
)
q+
holds as long as p1 ≤ p0−V
′
q−
q+
. The threshold on the right hand side of the inequality is
strictly higher than V ′′ as long as p0 > V
′
q− + V
′′
q+. Hence, by setting p1 = p0−V
′
q−
q+
> V
′′ ,
CP 1 is able to capture all the market. Hence, the best response is p1 = p0−V
′
q−
q+
.
We are now in a position to describe the equilibrium. It is quite easy to see that the only
mutual best response is such that p1 = V
′′ and p0 = V
′
q− + V
′′
q+. This implies that CPs’
proﬁts are π1 = V
′′
q+ − FA and π0 = V ′q− + V ′′q+ −
∑
Fi and that advertisers multi-home.
A similar reasoning applies when the conﬁguration is (0A,1AB), (0B,1AB) and (0AB,1B).
Consider now a conﬁguration with all CPs being distributed by only one ISP, i.e. either
(0A,1A) or (0B,1B). With a reasoning similar to that of the case of universal connection,
one can prove that the only equilibrium is such that p0 = p1 = V
′′ so that CPs’ proﬁts are
π1 = π0 = V
′′
q++ − FA. Again, advertisers multi-home.
Consider a market conﬁguration involving full segmentation, i.e. either (0A,1B) or
(0B,1A). In this case, each CP would be a monopolistic outlet for the consumers it reaches.
It is quite intuitive (we omit the proof) that equilibrium prices are p0 = p1 = V
′ and proﬁts
π1 = π0 =
V
′
2
− Fi. It is again the case that, in equilibrium, advertisers multi-home.
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Consider now a conﬁguration with one CP being distributed by both ISPs, while the other
CP being distributed by no ISP. Take, for example, the case (0AB,1N). No advertiser puts
an ad on CP 1 since no consumer can reach it. If an advertiser puts ads on CP 0, its total
surplus is V ′−p0. Thus, quite simply, the only equilibrium is such that p0 = V ′ . Hence, CPs’
proﬁts are π1 = 0, π0 = V
′ −∑Fi. In this case, advertisers single-home, since they have no
beneﬁt from advertising on CP 1. A similar reasoning applies to conﬁguration (0N,1AB).
Finally, consider a conﬁguration with one CP being distributed by one ISP, with the other
CP being distributed by none, such as (0A,1N). No advertiser puts an ad on CP1 since no
consumer is reached. If an advertiser puts ads on CP 0, its total surplus is
(
V
′ − p0
)
q+.
Thus, p0 = V
′ . Hence, CPs’ proﬁts are π1 = 0, π0 = V
′
q+ − FA. A similar reasoning applies
when the conﬁguration is (0N,1A), (0N,1B) and (0B,1N). 
5.3 Stage 1
At Stage 1, ISP i sets the access fee Fi and CPs decide to which ISP they want to connect,
if any. Our objective is now to determine the subgame-perfect equilibria of the game. We
begin from the benchmark case of net neutrality, where access fees Fi are constrained to zero.
Next, we consider the unregulated scenario, in which ISPs freely set Fi.
5.3.1 Benchmark: net neutrality regime
In the net neutrality case, proﬁts for ISPs are simply given by revenues collected from sub-
scription fees
πi =
(3t+Δi −Δ−i)2
18t
i = A,B
We now check which conﬁguration of the network occurs at equilibrium by studying CPs’
connection choices , given Fi = 0. Elaborating from Lemma 3, we have
Proposition 3 In the net neutrality regime:
• there always exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium entailing universal connection (i.e.
market conﬁguration (0AB,1AB)). It is such that
aNi = t q
N
i =
1
2
pNj = V
′′
qNj = 1 I
N
ij = 1 ∀i, j
• if and only if the value of second impressions of advertisements is low enough, i.e. V ′′ <
V
′
(
δγ
3t+δγ
)
, there also exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium entailing total fragmentation
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(i.e. market conﬁguration (0A,1B) or (0B,1A)). It is such that
aNi = t q
N
i =
1
2
pNj = V
′
qNj =
1
2
∑
j=0,1
INij = 1 I
N
ij = IN−ij ∀i, j
PROOF: Simply follows from the table in Lemma 3, setting Fi = 0. 
Under net neutrality, universal connection is always an equilibrium, even though it is not
necessarily the most desirable outcome for CPs. When connecting to the same ISP, each
CP produces a strategic externality on its rival, eliminating the possibility to charge the full
price V ′ for ad slots. It follows that, when the price of ad spaces is strongly reduced by
competition (i.e. V ′′ is signiﬁcantly smaller than V ′) CPs could make higher proﬁts if each
joined a diﬀerent ISP, fragmenting the network. Yet, since connection is free, the externality
is uninternalized and, as a result, universal connection obtains. In other words, CPs ﬁnd
themselves in a prisoner’s dilemma, to the beneﬁt of consumers and advertisers.
In contrast to the monopoly case studied in the previous Section, net neutrality is not
suﬃcient to guarantee universal connection. There also exists the possibility of a second
equilibrium, characterized by total fragmentation. This occurs when competition among
CPs strongly aﬀects their proﬁtability (i.e. V ′′ is small compared to V ′) and/or contents
are highly valuable to consumers and complementary. Indeed, the threshold V ′
(
δγ
3t+δγ
)
is
strictly increasing in δ and γ. Hence, if ad impressions rapidly lose value when repeated
and content is important for attracting consumers, fragmentation can occur even with net
neutrality regulation.
The last ﬁnding is quite counterintuitive: one would, a priori, expect that the more
consumers care about content and the greater their complementarity, the more CPs would
try to take advantage of these forces by connecting to all available ISPs. To see why it is not
the case, suppose (0A,1B) to be the market conﬁguration. Consider the problem of a content
provider, say 0, deciding whether to connect also to ISP B or not. If it does not connect to
B, the price it can charge for ad spaces is V ′ , given that it is the only outlet for advertisers
wanting to reach A’s consumers. If CP 0 connects to B as well, its consumer base is enlarged,
now including also B’s customers. Nevertheless, the price it can charge for ad spaces is now
the weighted average V ′q− + V ′′q+. This is because part of its audience would already be
reached by the rival content provider. Moreover, by connecting to B, CP 0 increases B’s
attractiveness for consumers relative to A. Hence, though connection to B is free, it has
an implicit cost: the quantity of eyeballs CP 0 monopolizes shrinks, since it induces part of
A’s consumers to migrate to B. This is particularly relevant when contents are valuable for
consumers and highly complementary. Thus, if the eﬀect of content availability on consumer
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Figure 4: Duopoly, equilibria with Net Neutrality: the red line represents threshold V ′
(
3t
6t+δ
)
.
UC stands for Universal Connection and TF for Total Fragmentation. Graphs are obtained
setting δ = 0.5 and γ = 1.
demand is high enough and/or the value of repeated ad impressions is small, the implicit
cost of an additional connection for CP 0 is too high. It follows that it may prefer not to
connect to the additional ISP, even if it can do so for free.26
5.3.2 Unregulated regime
We now study the unregulated regime, where the access fee Fi can be freely set. For a given
network conﬁguration to arise, the couple (FA, FB) has to be such that proﬁts of each CP
(see Table 3) in the given conﬁguration (and given the choice of the rival) have to be higher
than in any other conﬁguration. The equilibria are described in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 In the unregulated regime:
26We ﬁnd that the equilibrium with total fragmentation payoﬀ-dominates the one with universal connection,
since V
′′ ≤ V
′
2 when V
′′
< V
′
(
δγ
3t+δγ
)
. On the other hand, the latter risk-dominates the former. Let r ∈
(0, 1) be the probability that CP j chooses to join both ISPs and (1− r) the probability that it chooses to join
either A or B. The expected payoﬀ of CP j from joining both ISPs is always higher than the expected payoﬀ
from joining only one ISP in the region where both equilibria exist, i.e. r
(
V
′′
)
+ (1− r)
(
V
′
q− + V
′′
q+
)
>
r
(
V
′′
q+
)
+ (1−r)2
(
V
′′
q+++
)
+ (1−r)2
(
V
′
2
)
for all possible r when V
′′
< V
′
(
δγ
3t+δγ
)
. Hence, the payoﬀ
dominance criterion selects the equilibrium that induces total fragmentation, while the risk dominance one
selects the equilibrium inducing universal distribution. Harsanyi (1995) established that, when these two
criteria lead to diﬀerent solutions, risk dominant equilibrium should be the chosen one.
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• if and only if the value of second ad impressions is high enough, i.e.
V
′
(
3t
6t+ δ
)
≤ V ′′ ≤ V ′
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium entailing universal distribution (i.e. market
conﬁguration (0AB,1AB)). It is such that:
FUi = V
′′
q− aUi = t q
U
i =
1
2
pUj = V
′′
qUj = 1 I
U
ij = 1 ∀i, j
• if and only if the value of second ad impressions is low enough, i.e. if
0 ≤ V ′′ <
(
V
′
2
+
t
2
− (3t+ δ (1 + γ))
2
18t
)(
3t
3t+ δ (1 + γ)
)
there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium entailing total fragmentation (i.e. market
conﬁguration (0A,1B) or (0B,1A)). It is such that:
FUi =
V
′
2
aUi = t q
U
i =
1
2
pUj = V
′
qUj =
1
2
∑
j=0,1
IUij = 1 I
U
ij = IU−ij ∀i, j
PROOF: see Appendix. 
We see therefore that, in the unregulated regime, only universal connection and total
fragmentation can arise in equilibrium and that they never coexist.27 Figure 5 below provides
an illustration of the regions where the equilibria described take place, conditionally on
the values of V ′ and V ′′ . The thresholds reported in Proposition 4 are decreasing in the
value of contents δ, the ﬁrst faster than the second. Moreover, the ﬁrst is decreasing in
the extent of complementarity γ, while the second is independent of it. This implies that a
stronger valuation for contents by consumers increases the chances for universal connection
and, vice versa, reduces those of total fragmentation. On the other hand, greater content
complementarity makes total fragmentation less likely, while not aﬀecting the likelihood of
universal connection.
Let us ﬁrst provide the intuition for the equilibrium entailing total fragmentation. When
competition among CPs brings a strong decrease in ad rates (i.e. V ′′ is low with respect to V ′)
and/or availability of content is of little relevance for consumers and/or contents are highly
substitutable (i.e. δ and γ are small), ISPs are better oﬀ avoiding competition to attract CPs.
27Indeed, it can be veriﬁed that
(
V
′
2 +
t
2 − (3t+δ(1+γ))
2
18t
)(
3t
3t+δ(1+γ)
)
< V
′
(
3t
6t+δ
)
always holds.
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To attract both CPs, ISPs should ask for a very low access fee, renouncing to a large share of
proﬁts on the content side of the market, with little beneﬁt on the consumer side. Hence, the
equilibrium strategy is to set a high access fee V
′
2
. Said diﬀerently, per each consumer, an ISP
asks for the entire proﬁt made by selling exclusive ad impressions V ′ . A CP is willing to pay
such a fee if and only if there is no competition to attract advertisers targeting consumers
subscribing to the ISP. Consequently, the high fee induces network fragmentation. The most
proﬁtable deviation from this equilibrium for an ISP (say, A) is to charge a fee equal to only
V
′′ per consumer. Given that B maintains the high fee, both CPs join exclusively A, i.e.
conﬁguration (0A,1A) emerges. By so doing, ISP A becomes more attractive than the rival
in the eyes of consumers. However, when V ′′ , δ and γ are small, the costs on the content side
outweigh the gains on the consumer side and no ISP deviates.
On the contrary, when the presence of multiple CPs on an ISP brings a small decrease in
ad rates (i.e. V ′′ is high enough with respect to V ′) and/or availability of contents is relevant
for consumers (i.e. δ is large), ISPs compete to attract CPs and universal connection arises
in equilibrium. Thus, they end up setting a low fee (per consumer) equal to V ′′q−.28 While,
intuitively, content relevance and complementarity make total fragmentation less likely, com-
plementarity among contents γ is irrelevant for universal connection. This is surprising: a
priori, one would expect complementarity to increase incentives to attract both contents.
The reason this does not happen is that the most proﬁtable deviation from the universal
connection equilibrium is for ISP i to raise the fee to a level high enough to induce total
fragmentation. By so doing, the ISP gives up on revenues from one CP, at the same time
capturing extra proﬁts from the remaining CP through the higher fee. However, when V ′′
and δ are high, the extra proﬁts are too small. Hence, the equilibrium entailing universal
connection is sustainable. Moreover, since the network conﬁguration induced by deviating is
still symmetric, complementarity of contents is not relevant.
There exists a set of parameters such that no (pure-strategy) equilibrium exists: at least
one of the ISPs would like to deviate to a conﬁguration of the network that can not be
sustained at equilibrium. The interval is such that
(
V
′
2
+
t
2
− (3t+ δ (1 + γ))
2
18t
)(
3t
3t+ δ (1 + γ)
)
< V
′′
< V
′
(
3t
6t+ δ
)
28Other equilibria entailing universal connection may arise in which both access fees are smaller than
V
′′
q−, though only if V
′′
is strictly larger than V
′
(
3t
6t+δ
)
. We do not elaborate on such equilibria for
brevity, since their nature is essentially the same as the one described in Proposition 4: they are the result
of tariﬀ competition between ISPs in order to attract CPs. The only diﬀerence is that such competition may
drive access fees even lower than stated in the Proposition, while all other prices and quantities are invariant.
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Figure 5: Duopoly, equilibria in the Unregulated regime: the green line represents threshold(
V
′
2
+ t
2
− (3t+2δ)2
18t
) (
3t
3t+2δ
)
. The blue line represents threshold V ′
(
3t
6t+δ
)
. UC stands for
Universal Connection and TF for Total Fragmentation. Graphs are obtained setting δ = 0.5
and γ = 1.
Observe that this interval shrinks as the value of content δ goes to zero.29
As a ﬁnal remark, we note that there is no equilibrium involving partial fragmentation
(where a CP joins two ISPs and the other CP only one). It turns out that there are always
proﬁtable deviations from such a conﬁguration for at least one ISP. Take, for example, the
case (0A,1AB). Two situations are possible. In the ﬁrst, the value of repeated ad impressions
and content attractiveness for consumers are high enough that B (i.e. the ISP with only one
CP) prefers to lower its tariﬀ in order to try to have both CPs on board. In the other, V ′′
and δ are low enough that A (i.e. the ISP signing up two CPs) is better oﬀ excluding one of
them.
5.4 Comparison of net neutrality and unregulated regimes
5.4.1 Network conﬁgurations
Using the results of Propositions 3 and 4, we now proceed to a comparison of network con-
ﬁgurations under the two regulatory regimes.30 To begin, our results suggest that universal
distribution of contents is less likely in the unregulated regime than with net neutrality.
First, Propositions 3 and 4 imply that conditions for universal connection to be the unique
29We do not fully investigate the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria. However, we can prove that when(
V
′
2 +
t
2 − (3t+δ(1+γ))
2
18t
)(
3t
3t+δ(1+γ)
)
< V
′′
< V
′
(
3t
6t+δ
)
, attracting both CPs is a dominated strategyHence,
universal connection can never arise as an equilibrium conﬁguration, not even in mixed strategies.
30For the sake of clarity, we make this comparison considering parameter values such that pure-strategy
equilibria exist under both regimes.
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Figure 6: Occurrence of Universal Connection as unique equilibrium under Net Neutrality
(red and dashed area) and Unregulated regime (dashed). Graphs are obtained setting δ = 0.5
and γ = 1.
equilibrium are always weaker with net neutrality than in its absence. Moreover, universal
connection is always an equilibrium with network neutrality, while, in the unregulated regime,
it is an equilibrium only when repeated ad impressions do not lose much value compared to
a ﬁrst impression and\or content is highly valuable for consumers. Nevertheless, a change
in the regulatory regime does not necessarily imply a change in the network conﬁguration.
Indeed, when the impact of competition on advertising proﬁts is small, universal distribution
is the only equilibrium, even if net neutrality is removed. See Figure 6 for an illustration.
We have also found that total fragmentation can take place even if net neutrality is
maintained. This is the case when competition among CPs strongly reduces their proﬁtability
as advertising outlets. Nonetheless, when competition among CPs strongly impacts their
proﬁtability, total fragmentation is the unique equilibrium in the unregulated regime, but
not with net neutrality. As mentioned, a key diﬀerence between the two regimes is that ISPs
have a stake in proﬁts made by CPs in the unregulated regime, while they have not under net
neutrality. Under the unregulated regime, ISPs take into account that restricting available
contents reduces competition on the advertising market. Hence, they may be less interested
in distributing all the CPs. This highlights the importance of access fees as strategic variables
aﬀecting competition in the online advertising market. In the net neutrality regime, when
consumers have a weak valuation for contents and the value of repeated ad impressions is low,
each CP could make higher proﬁts by segmenting the market. Yet, free connection to the
network means that CPs may not be able to coordinate on a full fragmentation equilibrium.
Quite intuitively, in the unregulated regime, access fees act as the missing coordination device.
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Figure 7: Occurrence of Total fragmentation as unique equilibrium under Net Neutrality
(dashed area) and Unregulated regime (blue and dashed). Graphs are obtained setting δ = 0.5
and γ = 1.
As a consequence, contrarily to the net neutrality regime, total fragmentation is the unique
equilibrium. See Figure 7 for an illustration.
Summing up, the results suggest that, on the one hand, net neutrality certainly helps
preserving universal access to online content. On the other hand, the extent to which repeated
ad impressions lose value plays an important role in shaping the network conﬁguration,
regardless of the regulatory regime. We can thus state the following
Corollary If repeated impressions do not lose much value compared to ﬁrst impressions
(i.e. V ′
(
3t
6t+δ
) ≤ V ′′) universal connection is the unique equilibrium conﬁguration, regardless
of the regulatory regime. However, when the value of repeated ad impressions is lower, the
regulatory regime matters: ﬁrst, when V ′
(
δγ
3t+δγ
)
≤ V ′′ < V ′ ( 3t
6t+δ
)
universal connection is
the unique equilibrium with net neutrality but is impossible in the unregulated regime. Second,
when V ′′ < min
{
V
′
(
δγ
3t+δγ
)
;
(
V
′
2
+ t
2
− (3t+δ(1+γ))2
18t
)(
3t
3t+δ(1+γ)
)}
both total fragmentation
and universal connection are equilibria under net neutrality, but only total fragmentation is
an equilibrium in the unregulated regime.
5.4.2 The role of content availability and complementarity
Propositions 3 and 4 also provide interesting results in terms of the role played by content
value and complementarity in shaping network conﬁgurations. Interestingly, the extent to
which these aﬀect the likelihood of fragmentation changes (radically, in some instances) with
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Figure 8: Equilibria in the net neutrality (top) and unregulated (bottom) regimes. The left
hand graphs are obtained setting δ = 0.5 and the right hand ones setting δ = 1.5. We also
set V ′ = 5.
the regulatory regime. First of all, with net neutrality both the absolute valuation for content
δ and complementarity γ increase chances for fragmentation and, specularly, reduce those
of universal connection. In contrast, greater valuation of content by consumers makes it
more likely that universal connection is the unique equilibrium in the unregulated regime,
while content complementarity does not play any role. Moreover, in the unregulated regime,
the likelihood of total fragmentation decreases with the absolute valuation for content δ by
consumers, as well as with the extent of content complementarity γ. Figure 8 provides an
illustration.
5.4.3 Welfare comparison
Finally, we turn to a comparison of welfare under the two regulatory regimes. We ﬁrst analyze
the eﬀects brought by a change in the regulatory regime on each player taken separately. Next,
we consider the eﬀects on social welfare.
The equilibrium entailing universal connection is always optimal for consumers. This is
because they enjoy all existing contents and transportation costs are minimized. Compared
to the total fragmentation scenario, they end up paying the same subscription fee a = t, but
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enjoy a larger choice of contents. Indeed, their surplus is Z + δ (1 + γ)− 5
4
t under universal
connection and Z+δ− 5
4
t with the total fragmentation. From this and the above Corollary, it
follows that consumers are weakly better oﬀ under net neutrality than under the unregulated
regime.
Advertisers are also weakly better oﬀ under net neutrality. A change from the universal
connection to total fragmentation decreases their total surplus, which is equal to V ′ − V ′′ in
the former conﬁguration and to zero in the latter. This is because in the total fragmentation
case CPs can charge higher prices for ad spaces, extracting all their surplus. On top of
this, the number of impressions per ad is reduced, as possibilities for advertisers to reach
consumers are restricted. Therefore, like consumers, advertisers are never better oﬀ in the
unregulated regime, and strictly better oﬀ under net neutrality when ﬁrst ad impressions are
much more valuable than repeated ones.
Let us now look at ISPs and CPs. A switch from the net neutrality to the unregulated
regime always penalizes CPs while beneﬁting ISPs. This is true regardless of whether changes
in the regulatory regime modify the market conﬁguration or not. Under the unregulated
regime, ISPs obtain extra proﬁts from access fees paid by content providers. Moreover,
they see no change in proﬁts on the consumer side of the market, since all equilibria are
symmetric and total subscription fees collected are invariant. Indeed, the proﬁt of an ISP
is always πNi =
t
2
with net neutrality, while it obtains πUi =
t
2
+ 2V
′′
q− with universal
connection and πUi =
t
2
+ V
′
2
with total fragmentation in the unregulated regime. Each CP
gains πNj = V
′′ with universal connection and πNj =
V
′
2
with total fragmentation under net
neutrality, while it gains, respectively πUj = V
′′ − 2V ′′q− and πUj = 0 in the unregulated
regime. Thus, abandoning the net neutrality regime always entails a transfer of proﬁts from
CPs to ISPs.
To conclude, let us look at the change in social welfare. It is quite easy to see that
the higher the number of connections between ISPs and CPs, the higher the gross surplus
generated by both consumers and advertisers. Indeed, as stated in Lemma 1, universal
connection is the optimal conﬁguration from a social welfare point of view. Hence, as it
maximizes the chances for occurrence of universal connection, net neutrality is the (weakly)
optimal regulatory regime. Summing up, we conclude the following
Proposition 5 When repeated ad impression signiﬁcantly lose value compared to ﬁrst im-
pressions and content is of small importance for consumers, the unregulated regime reduces
consumer, advertiser and social welfare, compared to net neutrality. Otherwise, the regulatory
regime is immaterial for consumer, advertiser and social welfare. Finally, ISPs are always
better oﬀ and CPs always worse oﬀ under the unregulated regime than under net neutrality.
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PROOF: the result on total welfare simply follows from Lemma 1, Propositions 3 and 4 .
The results on consumer surplus, advertiser surplus, CPs’ proﬁts and ISPs’ proﬁts are shown
in the text. 
6 Conclusions
We have investigated the implications of net neutrality regulation (intended as a zero-price
rule for CPs) for the fragmentation of the Internet. Our analysis has highlighted an important
link between fragmentation and the advertising market. In particular, we have shown that,
without a zero-price rule, ISPs may use non-discriminatory access fees to rule out universal
connection of CPs. The rationale for this is to relax competition among CPs to attract
advertisers, recovering their extra proﬁts through the access fees. Our ﬁndings suggest that
net neutrality makes universal connection more likely. However, abandoning it does not
necessarily imply changes in network conﬁguration. First, universal connection can occur
also in the unregulated regime, as long as competition among CPs does not reduce the
proﬁtability of ad spaces to a large extent. Moreover, when competition has a strong impact,
total fragmentation can occur even under net neutrality. Nonetheless, total fragmentation
is the unique equilibrium if net neutrality is removed, but not if it is maintained. Finally,
since social welfare is maximized with universal connection, the unregulated regime is weakly
dominated by net neutrality.
We believe our ﬁndings to be an interesting addition to the rapidly-growing literature on
the topic. Of course, our analysis has some important limitations. First, we have modeled
consumers demand for content as exogenous. However, depending on the availability of
content, consumers may vary the intensity of use of the network. This may aﬀect proﬁtability
of content providers by creating additional congestion and changing the amount of time
consumers spend browsing each content. Second, we have assumed the amount of advertising
not to have an eﬀect on consumers demand for content. Third, we have disregarded the
issue of quality diﬀerentiation and service tiering. While we do not believe including the
above features would change our qualitative results, we also recognize that a more thorough
investigation of these important issues would be an interesting step for future research.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Looking at the table provided in Lemma 1, we have
35
1. Conﬁguration (0A,1A) obtains when
FA ≤ V ′′q++mon
2. (0A,1N) or (0N,1A)
V
′′
q++mon < FA ≤ V
′
q+mon
3. (0N,1N)
FA > V
′
q+mon
Setting now all Fi = 0, one easily veriﬁes that only the equilibria described in the claim
exist.
Proof of Proposition 2
ISP A can choose whether to provide access to both CPs or to only one CP. Clearly, providing
access to no CP is always a dominated choice. If it provides access to both CPs, ISP A will
set the highest access fee CPs are willing to pay given that both join A, i.e. FA = V
′′
q++mon.
In this case, ISP’s A proﬁts are
πA = 2V
′′
q++mon +
(Z + δ (1 + γ))2
4t
If A provides access to only one CP, it will set the highest fee a CP is willing to pay given
that it has exclusive access. set This is FA = V
′
q+mon.31 In this case, ISP’s A proﬁts are
πA = V
′
q+mon +
(Z + δ)2
4t
Hence, ISP A sets FA = V
′′
q++mon and induces the network conﬁguration (0A,1A) if
2V
′′
q++mon +
(Z + δ (1 + γ))2
4t
≥ V ′q+mon +
(Z + δ)2
4t
that is if
V
′′ ≥
(
V
′
(
Z + δ
2t
)
+
(Z + δ)2
4t
− (Z + δ (1 + γ))
2
4t
)(
t
Z + 2δ
)
otherwise, it sets FA = V
′
q+mon and induces the network conﬁguration (jA,j′N), with j, j′ ∈
{0, 1} 0 = 1. 
31The conﬁgurations (0A,1N) or (0N,1A) can take place if V
′′
q++mon < V
′
q+mon.
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Proof of Proposition 3
Looking at the table provided in Lemma 3, we have
1. Conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) obtains when
FA ≤ V ′′q− FB ≤ V ′′q− V ′′ ≥ FA + FB
2. (0AB,1A) and (0A,1AB)
FA ≤ V ′′q+ − V ′
(
1
2
− q−
)
V
′′
q− < FB ≤ V ′q− − V ′′
(
q+++ − q+)
FA + FB ≤ V ′′q+ + V ′q− FB > FA
and symmetrically for conﬁgurations (0AB,1B) and (0B,1AB), exchanging subscript A
with subscript B.
3. (0N,1AB) and (0AB,1N)
V
′′
q+ < FA ≤ V ′q−− V ′′q+ < FB ≤ V ′q−−
V
′′
< FA + FB ≤ V ′
4. (0A,1A)
FA ≤ V ′′q+++ FB > V ′q− − V ′′
(
q+++ − q+)
FB − FA > V
′
2
− V ′′q+++
and symmetrically for conﬁguration (0B,1B), exchanging subscript A with subscript B.
5. (0A,1B) and (0B,1A)
V
′′
q+ − V ′
(
1
2
− q−
)
< FA ≤ V
′
2
V
′′
q+ − V ′
(
1
2
− q−
)
< FB ≤ V
′
2
−V
′
2
+ V
′′
q+++ ≤ FA − FB ≤ V
′
2
− V ′′q+++
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6. (0N, 1A) and (0A,1N)
V
′′
q+++ < FA ≤ V ′q++ V
′
2
< FB
FB + FA > V
′
q− + V
′′
q+ FB > FA
and symmetrically for conﬁguration (0B,1N) and (0N,1B), exchanging subscript A with
subscript B.
7. (0N, 1N)
FA > V
′
q++ FB > V
′
q++ FB + FA > V
′
Setting now Fi = 0 i = A,B, one easily veriﬁes that only the equilibria described in the claim
exist.
Proof of Proposition 4
In order to determine the sub-game perfect equilibrium, we take each couple of access fees
(FA,FB) and each network conﬁguration associated to it,32 and we verify whether there exist
proﬁtable deviations for any ISP, given the fee of the rival. If there exists a proﬁtable
deviation, the couple of fees considered are not an equilibrium. Note that multiple network
conﬁgurations could arise for a given couple (FA,FB). We assume, when evaluating deviations
from a given equilibrium, that the ISP anticipates that the conﬁguration to arise is always
that which entails the smallest proﬁt. Hence, the set of equilibria we obtain is the largest
possible. The Proof is organized in the following way: we consider all possible network
conﬁgurations and study which couples (FA,FB) entail them as an equilibrium.
Market conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) From the Proof of Proposition 3, we know that for
this conﬁguration to arise we need Fi ≤ V ′′q− for i = {A,B}.33
First, assume that V ′′ ≤ V ′
2
. This implies that V ′′q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ≤ V ′′q−. Sup-
pose both ISPs i = {A,B} set Fi ∈
(
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ;V ′′q−] inducing conﬁguration
(0AB,1AB) and obtaining πi = 2Fi + t2 . Assume now ISP A deviates by decreasing its
fee. It is straightforward that this is never proﬁtable to decrease its fee, since the same
network conﬁguration emerges, but A makes less proﬁts. Now, assume that ISP A deviates
32We have determined the values of the access fees that could give rise to a given market conﬁguration in
the Proof of Proposition 3, by checking the incentives of the CPs to accept ISPs oﬀers.
33These constraints imply that FA + FB ≤ V ′′ is always satisﬁed.
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by increasing FA. In so doing, A can induce market conﬁguration (0B,1B) or (0A,1B).
From the Proof of Proposition 3, since FB ≤ V ′′q+++, (0B,1B) emerges as long as FA >
max
{
V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ; V ′
2
− V ′′q+++ + FB
}
. Clearly, this deviation never proﬁtable,
since A gains only πA = (3t−δ(1+γ))
2
18t
. Conﬁguration (0A,1B) emerges instead as long as
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) < FA ≤ V ′2 − V ′′q+++ + FB.34 Thus, the most proﬁtable deviation is to
set FA = V
′
2
− V ′′q+++ + FB, obtaining πA = FB + V
′
2
− V ′′q+++ + t
2
. It remains to verify
whether the deviation is proﬁtable. It is if FB + V
′
2
− V ′′q+++ + t
2
> 2FA +
t
2
. This depends
on parameter values. Of course, a symmetric reasoning can be followed for deviations by ISP
B. We can conclude that all couple of fees such that Fi ∈
(
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ;V ′′q−] for
i = {A,B} are an equilibrium inducing network conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) if
V
′′ ≥
(
V
′
2
+max {FB − 2FA;FA − 2FB}
)
1
q+++
≡ S2 (FA, FB)
Threshold S2 (FA, FB) is smallest when FA = FB = V
′′
q−. Hence, FA = FB = V
′′
q−
is the most robust among the equilibrium couples inducing this conﬁguration. Substituting
and rearranging, we obtain therefore that
V
′′ ≥ V ′
(
3t
6t+ δ
)
≡ S2
is a suﬃcient condition for the equilibrium inducing (0AB,1AB) to take place. Note also
that any access fee Fi ≤ V ′′q+ − V ′
(
1
2
− q−) for i = {A,B} can never arise at equilibrium,
since ISP i could increase its fee keeping inducing the network conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) but
with higher proﬁts.
Second, assume that V
′
2
< V
′′
< V
′
(3t−δγ)
3t+δ(1−γ) . This implies that V
′′
q− < min
{
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ;V ′q− −
Suppose both ISPs i = {A,B} ﬁx Fi ≤ V ′′q− inducing the network conﬁguration (0AB,1AB)
and obtaining πi = 2Fi+ t2 . Assume ISP A deviates by increasing its fee (of course, a similar
reasoning can be followed for ISP B). This can induce market conﬁguration (0B,1AB) or
(0B,1B).35 If FA > V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+), A induces market conﬁguration (0B,1B), which
is clearly not a proﬁtable deviation. If A sets FA = V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+), it gives rise to
market conﬁguration (0B,1AB) and obtains πA = V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) + (3t−δγ)2
18t
. This
deviation is proﬁtable if V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) + (3t−δγ)2
18t
> 2FA +
t
2
. Since this inequal-
ity is never veriﬁed, the network conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) with access fees Fi ≤ V ′′q− for
i = {A,B} is always is an equilibrium.
34Observe that min
{
V
′
2 ;
V
′
2 − V
′′
q+++ + FB
}
= V
′
2 − V
′′
q+++ + FB .
35Since in this region V
′
2 < V
′′
q+++, then the network conﬁguration (0B,1A) can never arise at equilibrium.
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Finally, assume that V
′
(3t−δγ)
3t+δ(1−γ) ≤ V
′′ ≤ V ′ . This implies that V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ≤
V
′′
q− < V
′′
q+−V ′ (1
2
− q−). Assume both ISPs i = {A,B} set Fi ∈ (V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ;V ′′q−]
inducing network conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) and proﬁts πi = 2Fi+ t2 . Assume ISP A deviates
by increasing its fee (of course, a similar reasoning can be followed for ISP B). As ISP A
increases its fee, in the worst scenario it looses all CPs, giving rise to market conﬁguration
(0B,1B). Since this deviation is never proﬁtable, market conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) with
Fi ∈
(
V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ;V ′′q−] for i = {A,B} is always an equilibrium. Remark that
FA and/or FB lower than or equal to V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+), associated to market conﬁg-
uration (0AB,1AB) can never arise at equilibrium, since, by increasing its fee, an ISP can
induce the same market conﬁguration and earn more proﬁts.
Market conﬁguration (0i,1ii′), with i, i′ ∈ {A,B} and i = i′ (and symmetric) For
concreteness, let us focus on conﬁguration (0A,1AB). From the Proof of Proposition 3,
we know that this market conﬁguration is feasible if FA ≤ V ′′q+ − V ′
(
1
2
− q−), V ′′q− <
FB ≤ V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) and FB > FA. Note that condition FA + FB ≤ V ′′q+ + V ′q−
is always veriﬁed given that the previous inequalities hold. The only fees that can sus-
tain this conﬁguration of the network at equilibrium are FA = V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) and
FB = V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+). Indeed, lower access fees (still within the above intervals)
are dominated, since an ISP can always increase its fee, induce the same conﬁguration and
gain strictly higher proﬁts. ISPs’ proﬁts are πA = 2
(
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−)) + (3t+δγ)2
18t
and
πB = V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) + (3t−δγ)2
18t
. Let us now describe conditions for this equilib-
rium to emerge. First, assume that V ′′ ≤ V ′
2
, which implies V ′′q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ≤ V ′′q−.
Assume that ISP A deviates by decreasing FA. This cannot be a proﬁtable deviation for
A, since it induces the same network conﬁguration, but gains less proﬁts. Now, assume
ISP A deviates from this point by increasing FA. By so doing, ISP A can either induce
market conﬁguration (0B,1B) or (0A,1B). If FA > V
′
2
− V ′′q+++ + FB = V
′
2
+ V
′
q− +
V
′′
q+ − 2V ′′q+++ conﬁguration (0B,1B) arises, and this is not a proﬁtable deviation for
A. Instead, if ISP A sets FA = min
{
V
′
2
; V
′
2
− V ′′q+++ + FB
}
, it gives rise to market con-
ﬁguration (0A,1B) and obtains proﬁts πA = min
{
V
′
2
; V
′
2
+ V
′
q− + V
′′
q+ − 2V ′′q+++
}
+ t
2
.
We now need to distinguish among two subcases. If V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ≥ V ′′q+++,
min
{
V
′
2
; V
′
2
+ V
′
q− + V
′′
q+ − 2V ′′q+++
}
= V
′
2
. Otherwise, min
{
V
′
2
; V
′
2
+ V
′
q− + V
′′
q+ − 2V ′′q+++
}
=
V
′
2
+ V
′
q− + V
′′
q+ − 2V ′′q+++. Thus, if V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ≥ V ′′q+++, the deviation is
proﬁtable for ISP V
′
2
+ t
2
> 2
(
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−))+ (3t+δγ)2
18t
, that is
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V
′′
<
(
V
′
(
1 +
δγ
6t
)
+
t
2
− (3t+ δγ)
2
18t
)(
6t
9t+ 2δ + 3δγ
)
≡ S4
If instead V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) < V ′′q+++, the deviation is proﬁtable if
V
′′
<
(
V
′
(
1
2
+
2δγ
6t
)
+
t
2
− (3t+ δγ)
2
18t
)(
3t
3t+ δγ
)
≡ S6
Consider now possible deviations by ISP B. Suppose it does so by decreasing FB. By setting
FB = V
′′
q−, B induces market conﬁguration (0AB,1AB) and obtains proﬁts equal to πB =
2V
′′
q− + t
2
. This is proﬁtable if 2V ′′q− + t
2
> V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) + (3t−γδ)2
18t
, that is if
V
′′
>
(
V
′
(
1
2
− δγ
6t
)
− t
2
+
(3t− δγ)2
18t
)(
6t
6t+ δ − 2δγ
)
≡ S5
Suppose now B deviates by increasing FB: this can only induce market conﬁguration (0A,1A),
which is never proﬁtable. It follows that the couple of fees FA = V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) and
FB = V
′
q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+), inducing conﬁguration (0A,1AB) are an equilibrium only if
V
′′ ≥ S4 and V ′′ ≤ S5 for V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ≥ V ′′q+++ and if V ′′ ≥ S6 and V ′′ ≤ S5
for V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) < V ′′q+++. It can be shown that this region is empty. Therefore,
network conﬁgurations (0A,1AB) and (0AB,1A), as well as all the symmetric, never arise at
equilibrium.
Second, suppose that V
′
2
< V
′′
< V
′
(3t−δγ)
3t+δ(1−γ) , which implies V
′′
q− < min
{
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ;V ′q− − V
Assume ISP B deviates by decreasing FB to V
′′
q+−V ′ (1
2
− q−)− ε, where ε > 0 and small.
This induces market conﬁguration (0B,1AB) or (0AB,1B) soB earns πB = 2
(
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−)− ε)+
(3t+δγ)2
18t
. Since it is always veriﬁed that 2
(
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−)− ε) + (3t+δγ)2
18t
> V
′
q− −
V
′′
(q+++ − q+) + (3t−δγ)2
18t
, this deviation is always proﬁtable. It follows that conﬁgurations
(0A,1AB) and (0AB,1A) and their symmetric are never equilibria.
Finally, assume V
′
(3t−δγ)
3t+δ(1−γ) ≤ V
′′ ≤ V ′ , which implies V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ≤ V ′′q− <
V
′′
q+−V ′ (1
2
− q−). Since V ′q−−V ′′ (q+++ − q+) < V ′′q+−V ′ (1
2
− q−)constraint FB > FA
is always violated. Hence, conﬁgurations (0A,1AB) and (0AB,1A) and their symmetric are
never equilibria.
Market conﬁguration (0i,1i′), with i, i′ ∈ {A,B} and i = i′ (and symmetric) Fol-
lowing the Proof of Proposition 3, we know that this market conﬁguration is feasible if the
following constraints hold: V ′′q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) < Fi ≤ V ′2 i = A,B and −V ′2 + V ′′q+++ ≤
Fi − Fi′ ≤ V
′
2
− V ′′q+++ i, i′ ∈ {A,B} , i = i′. Among all couples of fees that respect the
above conditions, the only sustainable at equilibrium are FA = FB = V
′
2
. Starting from any
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other couple, an ISP could always marginally increase its fee, induce the same conﬁguration
and gain higher proﬁts. Consequently, πA = πB = V
′
2
+ t
2
.
First, assume that V ′′ ≤ V ′
2
, which implies V ′′q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ≤ V ′′q−. Suppose ISP A
deviates by decreasing its fee to the largest one inducing conﬁguration (0A,1A) (given that
FB =
V
′
2
), i.e. to min
{
Fi′ − V
′
2
+ V
′′
q+++ − ε;V ′′q+++
}
= V
′′
q+++ − ε, where ε > 0 and
small. By so doing, A earns proﬁts πA = 2
(
V
′′
q+++ − ε) + (3t+δ(1+γ))2
18t
. The deviation is
proﬁtable if 2
(
V
′′
q+++ − ε)+ (3t+δ(1+γ))2
18t
> V
′
2
+ t
2
, that is if
V
′′
>
(
V
′
2
− (3t+ δ (1 + γ))
2
18t
+
t
2
)(
3t
3t+ δ (1 + γ)
)
≡ S1
Suppose now A deviates by increasing its fee. Obviously, it can only lose the only CP that it
has on board. Hence, this deviation is not proﬁtable. Summing up, the market conﬁguration
(0i,1i′) with FA = FB = V
′
2
is an equilibrium only if no ISP ﬁnds proﬁtable to deviate, that
is if V ′′ ≤ S1.
Second, suppose now that V
′
2
< V
′′
< V
′
(3t−δγ)
3t+δ(1−γ) , which implies V
′′
q− < min
{
V
′′
q+ − V ′ (1
2
− q−) ;V ′q−
Suppose ISPA deviates decreasing its fee. As before, by ﬁxing its fee equal tomin
{
FB − V
′
2
+ V
′′
q+++ − ε
V
′′
q+++ − ε it can induce market conﬁguration (0A,1A) and earn πA = 2
(
V
′′
q+++ − ε) +
(3t+δ(1+γ))2
18t
. As in the above case, the deviation is proﬁtable only if V ′′ > S1. Since we verify
that V ′′ > S1, then conﬁguration (0i,1i′) never arises at equilibrium in this region.
Finally, assume V
′
(3t−δγ)
3t+δ(1−γ) ≤ V
′′ ≤ V ′ , which implies V ′q− − V ′′ (q+++ − q+) ≤ V ′′q− <
V
′′
q+−V ′ (1
2
− q−). Since V ′′q+++ > V ′
2
, constraint −V ′
2
+V
′′
q+++ ≤ Fi−Fi′ ≤ V
′
2
−V ′′q+++
is always violated and this conﬁguration is never feasible.
Market conﬁguration (0N,1ii′), with i, i′ ∈ {A,B} and i = i′ (and symmetric)
Following the Proof of Proposition 3, this market conﬁguration is feasible if V ′′q+ < FA ≤
V
′
q−−. If this constraint is veriﬁed, then also the constraint V ′′ < FA + FB ≤ V ′ is always
veriﬁed. It can be observed that the region where this conﬁguration is feasible is a subset of
the region where (0i,1i′) is feasible. For a given access fee, ISP i earns the same proﬁts under
conﬁguration (0N,1ii′) or (0ii′,1N) and (0i,1i′) (since the proﬁts on the consumers’ side in
both cases are t
2
). Hence, an ISP can always deviate from this equilibrium by raising its fee,
so as to induce (0i,1i′). In this way, it earns higher proﬁts.
Market conﬁguration (0i,1i), (0N,1i), (0N,1N) with i ∈ {A,B} (and symmetric)
An ISP always ﬁnds proﬁtable to deviate from this conﬁguration. Indeed, it is straightforward
that by a small reduction in its fee, an ISP can increase its revenues.
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